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ABSTRACT
To prevail on a claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the plaintiff in a securities fraud action
must plead and prove loss causation, defined as a causal
connection between a defendant’s fraud and the plaintiff’s
economic loss. The analysis in this Article shows that loss
causation does not exist, and the defendant escapes liability, if
scientists cannot ex ante predict the corrective disclosure on
which the plaintiff’s loss causation theory is predicated. This
theory may be relevant in cases where a false or misleading
statement that distorted a company’s stock price is corrected by
an event such as an unpredictable drug reaction, an emerging
viral infection, or a novel computer security threat.
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INTRODUCTION

In a classic securities fraud class action,1 Rule 10b-5
cognizable fraud—such as the concealment of material

© 2022 Meiring de Villiers
* Meiring de Villiers, Academic Affiliate, NERA Economic Consulting
(meiring.devilliers@gmail.com).
1. See, e.g., Jay W. Eisenhofer et al., Securities Fraud, Stock Price
Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based Theory of
Loss Causation, 59 BUS. LAW. 1419, 1419–20 (2004) (referring to a case where
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information in violation of a duty to disclose2—distorts the
market price of a security, causing an investor to purchase
securities at an artificially inflated price.3 A disclosure event,
such as the materialization of a concealed risk,4 eventually
signals the truth to the market and the investor suffers a loss
when the share price declines.5 The defrauded investor may
bring a private action for securities fraud under Section 10(b) of
a stock price declines in response to a corrective disclosure as a “classic
securities fraud case”); see generally Ann Morales Olazábal, Loss Causation in
Fraud-on-the-Market Cases Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
337, 339–42 (2006) (describing the basic approaches to loss causation in
securities fraud cases).
2. Rule 10b-5 cognizable fraud includes misstatements and omissions,
such as “the active dissemination of materially false or misleading information,
the concealment of a known risk, the concealment of material information in
violation of a duty to disclose, or a fraudulent scheme in any manner designed
to cause or maintain artificial price inflation . . . .” Robert N. Rapp, Plausible
Cause: Exploring the Limits of Loss Causation in Pleading and Proving Market
Fraud Claims Under Securities Exchange Act §10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, 41
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 389, 467 (2015); see also Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu
Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639,
1640 (2004) (first citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 237 (1988); then
citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 857–65 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc)) (“[T]he federal securities laws are, at heart, about disclosure . . . . [A]
person who chooses to speak in a manner reasonably calculated to influence
investors assumes the duty to speak truthfully.”).
3. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 110, 124
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (describing the circuit split on whether plaintiffs sufficiently
pleaded loss causation by alleging that they purchased at an inflated price that
declined following a corrective disclosure); Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and
Disclosures: Securities Fraud Liability in the Shadow of a Corporate
Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 967, 970 (2019) (“A fraud-on-the-market lawsuit
allows for recovery of damages on behalf of investors who bought or sold publicly
traded securities in an efficient marketplace at a price distorted by fraud on the
part of the issuer or its management.”).
4. See, e.g., In re Massey Energy Co. Sec. Litig., 883 F. Supp. 2d 597, 625–
26 (S.D.W. Va. 2012) (describing how a mine explosion revealed what was
previously concealed material risk).
5. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 392 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Loss
causation is established if the market learns of a defendant’s fraudulent act or
practice, the market reacts to the fraudulent act or practice, and the plaintiff
suffers a loss as a result of the market’s reaction.”); Glaser v. Enzo Biochem,
Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 2006) (“It is only after the fraudulent conduct
is disclosed to the investing public, followed by a drop in the value of the stock,
that the hypothetical investor has suffered a ‘loss’ that is actionable after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dura.”); Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss
Causation Requirement for Rule 10b-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of
Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 63 BUS. LAW. 163, 172 (2007) (“Some [federal]
circuit courts have rightfully emphasized . . . the need for a corrective disclosure
as a prerequisite to establishing loss causation.”).
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the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 and Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission,7 the most widely used
antifraud provisions in federal securities law.8
Section 10(b) broadly prohibits manipulative or deceptive
conduct connected with the purchase or sale of a security. Under
Section 10(b), it is unlawful to:
[U]se or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.9

In 1942 the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 under authority
granted by Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j.10 Rule
10b-5 makes it unlawful:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.11

An implied private right of action for securities fraud under
Rule 10b-5 was first recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum

6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020).
8. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511,
540 (2011) (“[Rule 10b-5] can make a plausible claim to being the most
consequential piece of American administrative law.”); Allen Ferrell,
Corporations, Securities and Antitrust, The Supreme Court’s 2005-2008
Securities Trio: Dura Pharmaceuticals, Tellabs and Stoneridge, 9 ENGAGE 32,
32 (Oct. 2008) (“[T]he most important source of liability exposure firms and firm
management face today [is] class action litigation utilizing a Rule 10b-5 cause
of action.”); Evan Hill, The Rule 10b-5 Suit: Loss Causation Pleading Standards
in Private Securities Fraud Claims After Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 2666 (2010) (“Section 10(b) of the ‘34 Act is the
foremost antifraud provision in U.S. securities law and is utilized through its
primary mechanism of enforcement, SEC Rule l0b-5.”).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
10. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 113 (Kris Markarian
ed., 3d ed. 2011) (“Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under § 10(b), which gives the
SEC power to make rules prohibiting the use of ‘manipulative or deceptive
device[s] or contrivance[s] . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . .’”).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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Co.12 Other courts followed suit,13 and in 1971 the Supreme
Court approved a private cause of action.14 Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 are the most widely used antifraud provisions in
federal securities law.15
A Rule 10b-5 plaintiff must plead and prove the following
elements: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2)
scienter, namely a wrongful state of mind; (3) a connection with
the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss;
and (6) loss causation.16 This Article analyzes the sixth element,
loss causation. The analysis shows that loss causation does not
exist and a defendant escapes liability if scientists cannot ex
ante predict the corrective disclosure on which the plaintiff’s loss
causation theory is predicated. In this unique subset of cases,
there is no liability, even if all other Rule 10b-5 elements are
satisfied.
II. LOSS CAUSATION
To prevail on a claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the defrauded plaintiff must prove loss
causation, broadly defined as a causal connection between a
defendant’s fraud and the plaintiff’s economic loss.17 Neither the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 nor SEC Rule 10b-5 specifies

12. 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (“[I]n view of the general purpose
of the act, the mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not
sufficient to negative what the general law implies.”).
13. See, e.g., LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1049–50 (1951)
(explaining how the Kardon court’s recognition of an implied cause of action
“has . . . been followed in almost two score other cases” and “[n]o judge has
expressed himself to the contrary”).
14. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §
12.3[1], at 441 (6th ed. 2009) (describing evolution of implied right of action
under Rule 10b-5).
15. See, e.g., Ferrell, supra note 8, at 32.
16. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u– 4(b)(4) (“In any private action arising under this
chapter, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission
of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for which the
plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”); see also Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 336
(describing loss causation in that case as a “causal connection between the spray
device misrepresentation and the economic loss”).
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loss causation as an element of a securities fraud action. It is a
judicially created element that is rooted in the common law.18
Loss causation is one of the most commonly litigated issues
in securities fraud actions, featuring prominently in every phase
of a securities fraud case, including pleadings, class certification,
summary judgment, trial, appeals, and other post-trial
motions.19 It has long been a requirement in common law actions
for misrepresentation and deceit,20 but Schlick v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp.21 was the first federal circuit court opinion to
recognize loss causation as a distinct element of a Rule 10b-5
action.22
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA) codified the loss causation requirement by adding

18. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal
Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 815 (2009) (“The federal courts . . . have
used federal common law to define the contours of the [10b-5] cause of action.
Thus, the elements of a federal securities fraud claim, including the causation
requirement, are largely judge-made law.”); Ryan S. Thorson, Securities Law—
The Artificially Inflated Purchase Price Theory: An Economically Sound Yet
Legally Insufficient Method of Pleading and Proving Loss Causation, Dura
Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 6 WYO. L. REV. 623, 628 (2006) (“Loss causation
was not an element of a securities fraud cause of action under either the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or under SEC Rule 10b-5. Loss causation is a
judicially created element of a securities fraud action, and . . . it has historical
roots in the common law . . . .”).
19. See Jordan Eth & Su-Han Wang, Recent Developments in Loss
Causation, in Handling a Securities Case 2013: From Investigation to Trial and
Everything in Between, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES NUMBER B-2021 247, 251 (2013); Charles F. B. McAleer, Jr. & Yvonne
M. Williams, Loss Causation: A Durable Concept, 2006 BUS. TORTS J. 12, 12
(“Nowhere in the law have causation issues received more attention than in
fraud cases, particularly securities fraud cases.”).
20. See, e.g., Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 344 (2005) (discussing how loss
causation is a requirement in common law deceit and misrepresentation
actions); Ferrell & Saha, supra note 5, at 3 (finding that if “no injury is
occasioned by the lie, it is not actionable” (citing Pasley v. Freeman [1789] 100
Eng. Rep. 450, 457 (K.B.))); Rapp, supra note 2, at 391 (“With the implied
private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 rooted in the common
law of fraud and deceit, loss causation, or the common law analog ‘proximate
cause’, of an economic loss by alleged fraud or fraudulent conduct, has always
been a substantive element of investor claims.”).
21. 507 F.2d 374, 380–81 (2d Cir. 1974).
22. Ferrell & Saha, supra note 5, at 3; Fisch, supra note 18, at 864
(describing the Schlick court as “the source of the causation requirement in
federal securities fraud”).
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Section 21D(b)(4) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.23 This
provision, entitled “Loss Causation,” provides that plaintiffs in
private fraud actions “shall have the burden of proving that the
act or omission of the defendant . . . caused the loss for which the
plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”24 The provision codifies the
loss causation requirement developed by the courts,25 but
provides little guidance on interpreting, pleading, and proving
loss causation.26 The judiciary filled the legislative void, and the
construction of loss causation evolved through judicial decisionmaking.27
23. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–
67, § 101(b), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)
(2021)).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4); see also Berckeley Inv. Grp. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d
195, 208 n.15 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, Congress codified the common law loss causation requirement as a
statutory element of a Section 10(b) private cause of action.”).
25. Fisch, supra note 18, at 822 (“It is clear that Congress intended, in
section 21D(b)(4), to codify some version of the loss causation requirement that
the courts had previously developed and, through that requirement, to provide
a limiting principle for calculation of the plaintiff’s losses. Congress also
clarified that loss causation was a required element of the plaintiff’s case, as
opposed to an affirmative defense for which the defendant would bear the
burden of proof.”).
26. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Steckman & Robert E. Conner, Loss Causation
Under Rule 10b-5 A Circuit by Circuit Analysis: When Should Representational
Misconduct Be Deemed the Cause of Legal Injury Under the Federal Securities
Laws?, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION B-1061(1) 375, 396–97 (P.L.I. Corp. L. &
Prac. ed., 1998); Andrew M. Erdlen, Timing Is Everything: Markets, Loss, and
Proof of Causation in Fraud on the Market Actions, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 877,
893 (“[T]he PSLRA . . . codified loss causation, but provided very little guidance
to the courts.”); Fisch, supra note 18, at 813 n.6 (“Congress codified the loss
causation requirement as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 without defining loss causation or evidencing any intention to depart
from the existing judge-made definition.”); Olazábal, supra note 1, at 348 (“[The]
loss causation provision [in the PSLRA] fails to clarify what properly suffices to
plead or prove the causation element.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Class Actions and
Limited Vision: Opportunities for Improvement Through a More Functional
Approach to Class Treatment of Disputes, 83 WASH. U.L.Q. 1127, 1184 (2005)
(“[T]he PSLRA requires only that there be proof of loss—it does not specify the
acceptable methodologies for demonstrating such proof.”).
27. See, e.g., Buell, supra note 8, at 545 (“The law of securities fraud is one
of the most heavily judicially created bodies of federal law.”); Michael J.
Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation Under Federal
Securities Law, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 19 (2005) (“[C]ommon law fraud
causation authorities guide the judicial construction of the PSLRA’s loss
causation language.”); Devin F. Ryan, Comment, Yet Another Bough on the
“Judicial Oak”: The Second Circuit Clarifies Inquiry Notice and Its Loss
Causation Requirement Under the PSLRA in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 79
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The circuit courts were initially divided in their
interpretation of the statutory requirement.28 Under the
majority view, loss causation requires proof of a causal link
between the defendant’s fraud and actual economic losses to the
plaintiff.29 In contrast, a minority view held that plaintiffs need
only show that their purchase price was inflated because of the
misrepresentation.30
On April 19, 2005, in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo,31 the United States Supreme Court reconciled the
conflicting approaches among the circuit courts.32 In a
unanimous decision, the Court established that merely alleging

ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 485, 508 (2005) (“The indispensable element of causation
under the federal securities laws was judge-made and was principally bottomed
in tort law theory.”); Thorson, supra note 18, at 628–29.
28. Hill, supra note 8, at 2673–74 (“The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits followed what can be called the ‘date of purchase’
pleading standard. Under this interpretation, plaintiffs may adequately plead
loss causation by alleging that loss occurred at the moment that the defendant’s
security was purchased . . . The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits rejected this view. These courts required loss
pleading in addition to merely alleging an artificially inflated stock price at the
time of purchase. Under this standard, the plaintiff must plead actual economic
loss caused by a market correction, occurring in response to a public disclosure
revealing the defendant’s misrepresentation, which in actuality decreased an
inflated stock price to its intrinsic value.”).
29. See, e.g., Emergent Cap. Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343
F.3d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We think that the second amended complaint
contains legally sufficient allegations of a causal connection between the subject
matter of these omissions and the ultimate decline in NETV’s stock value, that
is, loss causation.”); Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th
Cir. 1997) (“Our decisions explicitly require proof of a causal connection between
the misrepresentation and the investment’s subsequent decline in value.”).
30. See, e.g., Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 832 (8th Cir.
2003) (“The fraud-on-the-market theory . . . allow[s] the fact finder to presume
that the stock’s price reflected the inflated earnings, and it makes sense to
conclude that the plaintiffs were harmed when they paid more for the stock than
it was worth. This is a sufficient allegation.”); Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc.,
339 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (same); Knapp v.
Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[P]laintiffs establish loss
causation if they have shown that the price on the date of purchase was inflated
because of the misrepresentation.”).
31. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
32. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the narrow question of
“[w]hether a securities fraud plaintiff invoking the fraud-on-the-market theory
must demonstrate loss causation by pleading and proving a causal connection
between the alleged fraud and the investment’s subsequent decline in price.”
Brief for Petitioners at i, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No.
03-932).
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price inflation due to a material misrepresentation or omission
does not sufficiently plead loss causation in a fraud-on-themarket case.33 Rather, a plaintiff needs to plead and prove that
the defendant’s fraudulent conduct proximately caused the
plaintiff’s economic loss.34 Scholars who analyzed the Dura
opinion observe that it “says no less than seven times that
proximate causation is the standard for loss causation.”35
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of loss causation is
authoritative but did not break new ground.36 A majority of

33. Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342 (“We begin with the Ninth Circuit’s
basic reason for finding the complaint adequate, namely, that at the end of the
day plaintiffs need only ‘establish,’ i.e., prove, that ‘the price on the date of
purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation’ . . . In our view, this
statement of the law is wrong.”).
34. Id. (noting the common-law roots of the securities fraud action (and the
common-law requirement that a plaintiff show “actual damages”) and holding
that the defendant’s statement must “proximately cause the relevant economic
loss”); see also Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market
Actions, 31 J. CORP. L. 829, 847 (2006) (“[P]roof at trial must provide evidence
that the inflated purchase price proximately caused an economic loss.”).
35. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Marcia Kramer Mayer, Dura and the New
Vocabulary of Litigation Under Rule 10b-5, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, Jan.
2006, at 14 n.21.
36. See, e.g., Ian Ackerman, Note, Forgive and Forget (The Efficient
Amnesiac): Loss Causation in a Well-Developed Post Dura Market, 25 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 557, 566 (2006) (asserting that the Dura Court reasonably
concluded “that Congress merely intended to codify the traditional loss
causation or proximate cause requirement long applied by the courts”).
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courts,37 as well as academic commentators38 and
practitioners,39 have embraced the interpretation of loss

37. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Arun Sen, Counterfactual Keys to Causation
and Damages in Shareholder Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 199, 218
(2009) (“The vast majority of courts have used the proximate cause standard,
mentioned in Dura . . . .”); see also Mineworkers’ Pension Scheme v. First Solar,
Inc., 881 F.3d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that a general proximate
cause test is the proper test for loss causation under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934); Lloyd v. CVB Fin. Corp., 811 F.3d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“Because loss causation is simply a variant of proximate cause . . . the ultimate
issue is whether the defendant’s misstatement, as opposed to some other fact,
foreseeably caused the plaintiff’s loss.”); Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter,
477 F.3d 162, 185 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[A] plaintiff must . . . prove that the
defendant’s misrepresentations proximately caused the plaintiff ‘s economic
loss . . . .”); Berckeley Inv. Grp. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 222 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“Causation in the securities context is strikingly similar to the familiar
standard in the torts context, but with different labels. In the securities
realm . . . ‘proximate cause’ is known as ‘loss causation.’”); Emergent Cap. Inv.
Mgmt v. Stonepath Grp., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We have often
compared loss causation to the tort law concept of proximate cause, ‘meaning
that the damages suffered by plaintiff must be a foreseeable consequence of any
misrepresentation or material omission.’” (citing Castellano v. Young &
Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2001))); Castellano, 257 F.3d at 186
(“While transaction causation is generally understood as reliance, loss
causation has often been described as proximate cause, meaning that the
damages suffered by plaintiff must be a foreseeable consequence of any
misrepresentation or material omission.” (referencing Suez Equity Invs. v.
Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2001))); AUSA Life Ins. Co. v.
Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 226 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[L]oss causation closely
corresponds to the common law principle of proximate cause.”); Semerenko v.
Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A]n investor must also
establish that the alleged misrepresentation proximately caused the decline in
the security’s value to satisfy the element of loss causation.”); Robbins v. Koger
Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Huddleston v. Herman
& MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on
other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983)); Litton Indus v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb
Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 747 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that causation corresponds with
the common law notion of proximate causation in a causation analysis); Mfrs.
Hanover Tr. Co. v. Drysdale Secs. Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Loss
causation derives from the common law tort concept of ‘proximate causation.’”);
Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549 (“The plaintiff must prove . . . that the untruth was
in some reasonably direct, or proximate, way responsible for his loss.”);
Spreitzer v. Hawkeye State Bank, 779 N.W.2d 726, 742 (Iowa 2009) (stating
that the plaintiff must establish “that the fact misrepresented increased the
risk of the specific damages claimed”).
38. See HAZEN, supra note 14, at 479–81 (describing the analysis of loss
causation as similar to the analysis of proximate cause); Bradford Cornell &
James C. Rutten, Collateral Damage and Securities Litigation, 3 UTAH L. REV.
717, 744 (2009) (“Loss causation is the securities law equivalent of proximate
causation.”); Dunbar & Sen, supra note 37, at 218 (“The vast majority of courts
have used the proximate cause standard, mentioned in Dura.”); Fisch, supra
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causation as a proximate causal relation between a defendant’s
fraud and a plaintiff’s economic loss. For instance, Professor
Robert N. Rapp describes loss causation as “the proximate
causal link between alleged misconduct in violation of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and a plaintiff’s economic harm.”40
Professor Thomas Lee Hazen describes the analysis of loss
causation as similar to the analysis of proximate cause,41 and
Professor Barbara Black explains that “[t]he requirement of loss
causation derives from the tort concept of proximate
causation.”42 On January 31, 2018, the Ninth Circuit held that

note 18, at 816 (2009) (“Subsequent courts have analogized loss causation to
proximate or legal cause”); Jason N. Haycock, Pleading a Loss Cause: Resolving
the Pleading Standard for the Element of Loss Causation in a Private Securities
Fraud Claim and a Plaintiff’s Heavy Burden Pleading it Under Iqbal, 60 AM.
U. L. REV. 173, 182 (2010) (“Analytically, loss causation is often best understood
as analogous to the tort element of ‘proximate cause.’”); Justin D. Levinson &
Kaiping Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts: A Cultural Psychological
Critique of Tort Law’s Actual Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries, 13 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 195, 200 (2004) (“[The inquiry as] to whether there is proximate
cause [or loss causation], [is] an inquiry driven by policy considerations such as
whether the law should hold the defendant legally responsible for the harm
caused by the defendant’s [wrong].”); Andrew J. Morris & Lucius Outlaw,
Clarifying Loss Causation: Reconciling the ‘Zone of Risk’ Test With Dura
Pharmaceuticals, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP., 1910, 1911 (2006) (“[T]he [Dura]
Court emphasized the distinctness of the loss causation requirement, and
placed that requirement squarely in the tradition of proximate cause law and
scholarship.”); Ryan, supra note 27, at 509 (“[L]oss causation, the far more
subtle stepchild of causation, is arguably analogous to the tort concept of
proximate or legal causation.”); Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market
Intermediation, Publicness and Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH. U.L. REV.
487, 498 (2015) (“Loss causation responds to the legal and policy concerns that
the plaintiffs should not be insured against market changes. This element plays
the intervening or proximate cause role that the Palsgraf case plays in
traditional tort cases.” (citing Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty:
Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 181–84 (discussing the
Dura Court’s analysis of loss causation))).
39. See, e.g., David B. Saxe & Danielle C. Lesser, Loss Causation in
Securities Fraud Cases, N.Y.L.J. 1, 1 (2017) (“Proximate cause is a vital element
in negligence cases, but is also an important element in securities fraud cases,
where it is known as loss causation.”).
40. Rapp, supra note 2, at 391.
41. HAZEN, supra note 14, at 479–81.
42. Barbara Black, The Second Circuit’s Approach to the “In Connection
With” Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 79 FACULTY ARTICLES & OTHER PUBL’NS 539,
554 (1987).
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“a general proximate cause test . . . is the proper test” for loss
causation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.43
III. PROXIMATE CAUSE
Proximate cause may be broadly (if somewhat
tautologically) defined as “a reasonably close connection between
a defendant’s wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s injury.”44 It protects
defendants from liability for consequences that—as a matter of
“fairness, policy, and practicality”—fall beyond the scope of their
moral accountability.45
Proximate cause is a dualism. It is governed by two
doctrines, namely the reasonable foresight doctrine and the
direct consequences doctrine.46 The reasonable foresight
43. Mineworkers’ Pension Scheme v. First Solar, Inc., 881 F.3d 750, 755
(9th Cir. 2018) (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005));
accord Lloyd v. CVB Fin. Corp., 811 F.3d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016); Loos v.
Immerson Corps, 762 F.3d 880, 887 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 627
F.3d 376, 394 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Daou Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 411 F. 3d 1006,
1025 (9th Cir. 2005).
44. David G. Owen, Idea: The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1671, 1681 (2007); see Robbins v. Koger Props., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th
Cir. 1997) (requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s fraud caused the
loss “in some reasonably direct, or proximate, way” (quoting Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981))).
45. Owen, supra note 44, at 1681(“[P]roximate cause addresses instead the
question of whether in logic, fairness, policy, and practicality, the defendant
ought to be held legally accountable for the plaintiffs harm) (emphasis added);
SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 107 (3d Cir. 2013); CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564
U.S. 685, (2011); Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)
(referring to proximate cause as a generic name for a set of tools courts “[use]
to limit a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own
acts”); DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 686–87 (2d ed. 2011) (“The
function of proximate cause rules is to facilitate or express a value judgment
about the appropriate scope of liability of a defendant who is negligent and
whose negligence in fact causes harm.”); Fox, supra note 34, at 831 (“The
function of the loss causation requirement, like the function of proximate cause
in actions for negligence, was to prevent the wrongdoer from being responsible
for all the consequences for which his action was a but for cause, i.e., all the
losses, however unrelated to the misstatement, that the plaintiff might suffer
over time as a result of purchasing this security.”); Mark F. Grady, Proximate
Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 315 n.71 (2002) (describing proximate
cause as a “liability-limiting doctrine . . . [that] creates an impact only by
barring liability”); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
1735, 1741 (1985) (“Causation is not equivalent to responsibility.”).
46. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 45, at 451–70 (“When there is a sequence
of events leading to the plaintiff’s injury, in order to hold the defendant liable
for damages, the cardinal rule of proximate causation in tort law is that the
plaintiff’s harm must have been the direct (as opposed to the indirect or remote)
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doctrine asks whether the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff
was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant’s
wrongdoing.47 The direct consequences doctrine examines
whether an intervening cause between the defendant’s
wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s harm supersedes and therefore
cuts off the liability of the defendant.48 Both doctrines must be
satisfied for proximate cause to exist. The plaintiff’s loss must be
both directly caused by the challenged conduct and be a
reasonably foreseeable result of it.49
Loss causation, as a proximate causal relation, must
likewise satisfy the duality requirement of foreseeability and
directness. The duality interpretation of loss causation in
securities fraud litigation is supported by common law

and foreseeable (as opposed to unforeseeable) consequence of the defendant’s
acts in a causal chain of events, unbroken by any intervening, superseding
cause.”); Mark F. Grady, Causation and Foreseeability, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORTS 136 (Jennifer Arlen ed.,
2013) (“[T]he traditional doctrine of proximate cause represents two branches
that must both be satisfied: the reasonable-foresight doctrine and the directconsequences doctrine.”); Peter N. Swisher, Causation Requirements in Tort
and Insurance Law Practice: Demystifying Some Legal Causation Riddles, 43
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 12 (2007) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 272–300 (5th ed. 1984)).
47. See Grady, supra note 45, at 299 (explaining how the reasonable
foresight doctrine examines whether a systematic relationship existed between
the plaintiff’s harm and the defendant’s breach of duty); Owen, supra note 44,
at 1683 (“Under [the reasonable foresight] test, the responsibility of an actor for
the consequences of wrongful action is limited by principles of reasonable
foreseeability.”).
48. See Grady, supra note 45, at 299 (“The direct consequences doctrine of
proximate cause examines concurrent causes [of the plaintiff’s loss] to see
whether the person responsible for the second cause has cut off the liability of
the person responsible for the first cause.”).
49. See, e.g., Swisher, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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precedent50 and academic commentators.51 For instance, in Suez
Equity Investors v. Toronto-Dominion Bank,52 the Second Circuit
defines loss causation explicitly in terms of directness and
foreseeability: “The loss causation inquiry typically examines
how directly the subject of the [defendant’s misstatement or
omission] caused the [plaintiff’s] loss, and whether the resulting
loss was a foreseeable outcome of the [misstatement or
omission].”53
The common law also interprets loss causation as a liabilitylimiting doctrine that serves the same policy goals underlying
the tort concept of proximate cause.54 Professor Lawrence
Steckman explains:
50. McCabe v. Ernst & Young LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The
loss causation inquiry typically examines how directly the subject of the
fraudulent statement caused the loss, and whether the resulting loss was a
foreseeable outcome of the fraudulent statement.” (quoting Berckeley Inv. Grp.
v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 222 (3rd Cir. 2006))); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch Co., 396
F.3d 161, 172–74 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[D]amages suffered by plaintiff must be a
foreseeable
consequence
of
any
misrepresentation
or
material
omission . . . [and] loss causation has to do with the relationship between the
plaintiff’s investment loss and the information misstated or concealed by the
defendant . . . . If that relationship is sufficiently direct, loss causation is
established.”); First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 769
(2nd Cir. 1994) (“Many considerations enter into the proximate cause inquiry
including the foreseeability of the particular injury, the intervention of other
independent causes, and the factual directness of the causal connection.”
(quotation omitted)).
51. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Steckman et al., Loss Causation, Economic Loss
Rules and Offset Defenses—Dismissal Motion Practice After Acticon A.G. v.
China Northeast Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 31 TOURO L. REV. 501, 516 (2015)
(“[The doctrine of loss causation] preclud[es] recovery when injury was neither
foreseeable nor a direct (causal) result of the challenged conduct.”).
52. 250 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001).
53. Id. at 96.
54. See, e.g., First Nationwide Bank, 27 F.3d at 769 (describing how loss
causation is intended “to fix a legal limit on a person’s responsibility, even for
wrongful acts”); McCabe, 494 F.3d at 425 (“[L]oss causation focuses on whether
the defendant should be held responsible as a matter of public policy for the
losses suffered by the plaintiff.”); accord Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP,
476 F.3d 147, 156 (2nd Cir. 2007) (“Loss causation . . . ’is intended to fix a legal
limit on a person’s responsibility even for wrongful acts,’ and it requires that
the plaintiff’s loss be foreseeable.”); Berckeley Inv. Group, 455 F.3d at 222
(“Similar to the concept of proximate cause in the tort context, loss causation
focuses on whether the defendant should be held responsible as a matter of
public policy for the losses suffered by the plaintiff.”); Suez Equity Investors LP
v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2001) (“In the end, whether
loss causation has been demonstrated presents a public policy question, the
resolution of which is predicated upon notions of equity because it establishes
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The policy behind loss causation is the same as that which underlies
the concept of tort law proximate causation, namely avoidance of
recovery of potentially unlimited damage claims that would
contravene public policy and turn errant defendants into windfall
guarantors. It does so by precluding recovery when injury was neither
foreseeable nor a direct (causal) result of the challenged conduct.55

In summary, the common law interprets loss causation as a
proximate causal relation, (1) as a matter of Supreme Court
precedent, (2) as a directness/foreseeability dualism, and (3) as
a liability-limiting doctrine that serves the same policy goals
underlying the tort concept of proximate cause.
IV. REASONABLE FORESIGHT
The reasonable foresight doctrine asks whether the type of
harm suffered by the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable at the
time of the defendant’s wrongdoing.56 The basic test of
foreseeability can be described as “whether one can see a
systematic relationship between the type of [harm] that the
plaintiff suffered and . . . the defendant’s [wrongdoing].”57
A medical example provides a good illustration. Medical
opinion is near unanimous that lung cancer is a foreseeable
consequence of human exposure to tobacco smoke.58 Clinical

who, if anyone, along the causal chain should be liable for the plaintiffs’
losses.”); Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting First Nationwide Bank, 27 F.3d at 769); Cornell & Rutten, supra note
38, at 745 (“[L]oss causation, like common law proximate causation, is not just
analytically driven—it is policy driven as well.”); Fisch, supra note 18, at 825
(“Dura established loss causation as the key gatekeeping mechanism for private
securities fraud litigation.”); Fox, supra note 34, at 831 (“The function of the loss
causation requirement, like the function of proximate cause in actions for
negligence, was to prevent the wrongdoer from being responsible for all the
consequences for which his action was a ‘but for’ cause, i.e., all the losses,
however unrelated to the misstatement, that the plaintiff might suffer over time
as a result of purchasing this security.”); Sale & Thompson, supra note 38, at
498 (“Loss causation responds to the legal and policy concerns that the plaintiffs
should not be insured against market changes. This element plays the
intervening or proximate cause role that the Palsgraf case plays in traditional
tort cases.”).
55. Steckman et al., supra note 51, at 516.
56. See Thomas J. Miceli, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 61 (3rd ed.
2004) (“[T]he reasonable foresight test asks whether a reasonable person would
have foreseen that his failure to meet the due standard would cause the victim’s
injuries.”).
57. Grady, supra note 45, at 323.
58. See, e.g., BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., ESSENTIAL CELL BIOLOGY 719 (3d ed.
2010) (“By far the most important environmental cause of cancer in the modern
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evidence shows that carcinogens in tobacco smoke interact with
human DNA to cause genetic mutations that ultimately result
in lung cancer.59 The carcinogens and the disease-causing
mechanisms they initiate define a systematic relationship
between tobacco smoke and lung cancer that establishes the
requisite foreseeability.
The general common law rule is that the type of injury must
be foreseeable, rather than its extent or manner of occurrence.60
The reasonable ignorance of the relationship doctrine of
proximate causality creates an exception to the rule.61 Under the
reasonable ignorance doctrine the defendant escapes liability
when, even though ex post there is clearly a systematic
relationship between the defendant’s wrongdoing and the
world . . . is tobacco-smoking, which is not only responsible for almost all cases
of lung cancer but also raises the incidence of several other cancers.”); R. BONITA
ET AL., BASIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 9 (2d ed. 2006) (“It is now clear that the main
cause of increasing lung cancer death rates is tobacco use.”).
59. See, e.g., E. Brambilla & A. Gazdar, Pathogenesis of Lung Cancer
Signalling Pathways: Roadmap For Therapies, 33 EUR. RESPIRATORY J. 1485,
1486 (2009) (“Among the 20 carcinogens that are present in tobacco smoke and
strongly associated with lung cancer development, the best known are polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons and nicotine-derived nitroso-aminoketone, which lead
to genetic mutations through DNA adduct formation.”); Stephen S. Hecht,
Tobacco Smoke Carcinogens and Lung Cancer, 91 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1194,
1194 (1999) (describing how much is now known about the carcinogens in
cigarette smoke, their conversion to forms that react with DNA, and the
miscoding properties of the resulting DNA adducts that cause the many genetic
changes known to exist in human lung cancer).
60. See ERIC E. JOHNSON, 1 TORTS: CASES AND CONTEXT 331 (2015) (“The
general rule is that an unforeseeable extent of harm will not cause a failure of
proximate causation. Alternatively stated, under the eyes of the law, the extent
of the harm, no matter how great, is considered to be foreseeable.”); Michael D.
Green, The Federal Employers’ Liability Act: Sense and Nonsense About
Causation, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 503, 541 n.196 (2012) (“Harm may occur due to
an unusual concatenation of events, but if the harm is reasonably foreseeable
or it results from the risks that made the defendant negligent, liability should
follow.” (first citing Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 670
(N.Y. 1980), then citing Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical &
Emotional Harm §29 cmt. o (2010))); David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277, 1298 (2009) (“It commonly is said that
responsibility requires only that an actor foresee the type of harm, not the
manner of harm nor the extent of harm.” (emphasis added) (citing Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical Harm § 29 cmt. i (Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 2005) (addressing levels of generality in conceiving “type of harm”))); see also
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical Harm § 29 cmt. o (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (addressing “manner of harm”); id. at § 29 cmt. p
(addressing “extent of harm”); id. at § 29 cmt. i (addressing “type of harm”).
61. See Grady, supra note 45, at 328.
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plaintiff’s harm, scientists could not predict the relationship ex
ante.62
The classic reasonable ignorance case is Overseas Tankship
(UK) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. (The Wagon Mound
No. 1).63 In Wagon Mound No. 1, a tank ship, the Wagon Mound,
was loading furnace oil at the Caltex Wharf in Sydney,
Australia.64 The plaintiffs owned a wharf where their employees
were doing welding work on a ship, the Corrimal.65 The Wagon
Mound negligently discharged oil that spread over the bay and
under the plaintiff’s wharf.66 The plaintiffs’ operations manager
saw the oil on the water, and gave instructions that no welding
was to be done.67 He then discussed the situation with the
manager of the Caltex Wharf, who assured him that it was safe
for normal welding operations to continue because there was no
apparent fire hazard.68 The fuel oil floating on the water could
not ignite because the oil could not normally reach its flashpoint
of 170 degrees Fahrenheit (about seventy-seven degrees Celsius)
while floating on the surface of the water.69 With this
reassurance, welding operations resumed.70
After a while, the oil caught fire, causing substantial
damage to the plaintiffs’ wharf and another ship docked in the
vicinity.71 The oil ignited in an unusual manner. Some debris
62. See id.; see also Lara Khoury & Stuart Smyth, Reasonable
Foreseeability and Liability in Relation to Genetically Modified Organisms, 27
BULL. SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 215, 225 (2007) (discussing how uncertainty as to the
impact of biotechnological activities makes it “less likely it is that the courts
will find that [an] injury was foreseeable”); Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1247, 1257 (2009) (“Imagine a plaintiff arguing that a developer could have
cheaply rendered the fireplace in a house more heat-resistant by using a
specially engineered, low-cost resin. Is it relevant whether the technology for
the resin was available or discoverable to a reasonable architect when the house
was built? Of course it is.”).
63. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The Wagon
Mound No. 1) [1961] AC 388 (PC) (appeal taken from New S. Wales) (U.K.).
64. Id. at 390.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 390–91.
67. Id. at 391.
68. Id.
69. See Kit Barker et al., THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 559 (5th ed.
2012).
70. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The Wagon
Mound No. 1) [1961] A.C. 388 (PC) 391 (appeal taken from New S. Wales) (U.K.).
71. Id.
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attached to a piece of cotton had been floating on the water under
the oil layer, invisible to any observer.72 A welder’s torch set off
sparks that struck the cotton.73 The cotton smoldered for a while
and eventually acquired sufficient heat to ignite the oil, causing
the fire that burned down the dock.74
The dock owner sued the charterers of the Wagon Mound,
alleging that the destruction of his wharf was caused by the
negligence of the defendant’s employees.75 Based on the trial
court’s finding that “the defendant did not know and could not
reasonably be expected to have known that [the furnace oil] was
capable of being set afire when spread on water,” the Privy
Council held that the defendants were not liable for the fire
damage.76
The oil spill created several risks, including hazards
associated with pollution and fire.77 The risk of pollution was
foreseeable, but did not cause the harm alleged. The fire hazard
was unforeseeable, because of the physical nature of the oil.78
The court accepted the testimony of “a distinguished scientist”
who stated that the defendant could not have reasonably
foreseen that the particular kind of oil would be flammable when
spread on water.79 The Privy Council therefore denied liability
on foreseeability grounds, finding that the defendant was
reasonably ignorant of the risk that materialized to cause the
plaintiff’s harm.80
The foreseeability issue in Doughty v. Turner
Manufacturing Co.81 turns on analogous facts. In Doughty, a

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 409.
76. Id. at 413; see also ERIC E. JOHNSON, TORTS: CASES AND CONTEXT 342
(2d ed. 2019) (explaining that in Overseas Township the defendant was
reasonably ignorant of capability of furnace oil to ignite, “based on ‘a wealth of
evidence’ including testimony of one Professor Hunter, ‘a distinguished
scientist’”).
77. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The Wagon
Mound No. 1) [1961] A.C. 388 (PC) 391 (appeal taken from New S. Wales) (U.K.).
78. Id. at 389.
79. Id. at 413.
80. Id. (“The raison d’être of furnace oil is, of course, that it shall burn, but
I find the [appellants] did not know and could not reasonably be expected to
have known that it was capable of being set afire when spread on water.”).
81. Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co. (1964) 1 QB 518 (U.K.).
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technician negligently knocked the cover of a vat made of
sindanyo, a combination of cement and asbestos, into molten
sodium cyanide contained in the vat.82 A chemical reaction
between the molten liquid and the material of the cover caused
an eruption that resulted in burn injuries to the plaintiff.83 The
fact that sindanyo could undergo this reaction at sufficiently
high temperatures was unknown to scientists at the time.84
The type of harm suffered by the plaintiff (burning due to
splashing of hot molten liquid) was a foreseeable consequence of
the defendants’ reckless handling of the liquid, yet the
defendants escaped liability.85 The systematic relationship
between the defendants’ misconduct and the plaintiff’s injury
(splashing due to obscure chemical reaction) was unknown to
scientists, as well as materially different from what was known
and foreseeable (splashing due to mechanical action).86 The
defendant therefore appropriately escaped liability under the
reasonable foresight doctrine.87
The next section analyzes the reasonable ignorance doctrine
as a liability-limiting mechanism in private securities fraud
litigation.
V. RULE 10B-5 MEETS WAGON MOUND
In a securities fraud action, the corrective disclosure that
reveals the defendant’s fraud and triggers the plaintiff’s

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 519.
Id. at 519–20.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 518.
Mark F. Grady, Causation and Foreseeability, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORTS 114, 134 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013) (“The
plaintiff’s lawyer [in Doughty] argued that the eruption was a mere variant of
mechanical splash risk, but the court decided for the defendant.”).
87. “The basic purpose of reasonable-foresight proximate cause is to cut off
liability for ‘unique’ accidents. These are accidents that are not mere variants
of those that were ex ante foreseeable.” Id. at 127; see also Hughes v. Lord
Advocate (1963) 1 All E.R. 705, 710 (U.K.) (Carmont, L.J., dissenting) (rejecting
the court’s ruling, stating, “it is said that, while a paraffin fire . . . was a
reasonably foreseeable risk so soon as the pursuer got access to the lamp, an
explosion was not. To my mind the distinction drawn between burning and
explosion is too fine to warrant acceptance”); Mario J. Rizzo, Law Amid Flux:
The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291,
303 (1980) (discussing the court’s decision in Hughes and explaining, “[h]ere
exploding is viewed as a mere variant of a clearly foreseeable type of risk:
burning. The plaintiff was thus allowed to recover”).
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economic loss is an essential element of the systematic
relationship between the fraud and the loss.88 A defendant may
therefore escape liability under the reasonable ignorance
doctrine if scientists could not predict the corrective disclosure
ex ante. The following case provides an illustration.
In In re Massey Energy Co. Sec. Litig.,89 a disastrous
explosion at one of the mines of Massey Energy Co., the fourth
largest coal producer in the United States, caused the deaths of
twenty-nine miners.90 The price of Massey common stock
declined sharply following the accident.91 Within weeks of the
explosion, Massey shareholders who had suffered losses filed a
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim, alleging that false and
misleading statements and omissions by the company about the
safety of its mining operations had inflated the price at which
they had purchased Massey common stock.92
The Court found that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged loss
causation by demonstrating that the defendant’s misstatement
and omission had concealed a risk that, when revealed by the
explosion, caused a decline in the price of Massey common
stock.93 The mine explosion was “a disclosure event in starkest
terms.”94
The court stated:
[T]he explosion and the cause of the explosion revealed to the market
the fraudulent nature of which Plaintiffs complain, specifically, that

88. Rapp, supra note 2, at 394 (“However labeled, it is a disclosure event in
one form or another that ties the alleged fraud to demonstrable losses.” (citing
Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005))); Glaser v. Enzo
Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 2006) (“It is only after the fraudulent
conduct is disclosed to the investing public, followed by a drop in the value of
the stock, that the hypothetical investor has suffered a ‘loss’ that is actionable
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura.”); William F. Sullivan et al.,
Pleading and Proving Loss Causation: Litigating Securities Fraud in
a Post-Dura World, PAUL HASTINGS (Nov. 18, 2010), https://webstorage.paulha
stings.com/Documents/PDFs/1771.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2022) (“[A] plaintiff
must allege a sufficient connection between the revelation of truth following an
alleged misstatement or omission [and subsequent loss] to sufficiently plead
loss causation.”).
89. 883 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D.W. Va. 2012).
90. Id. at 601, 605.
91. Id. at 608.
92. Id. at 608, 612, 625–26.
93. Id. at 626; Rapp, supra note 2, at 436 (“The court was satisfied
that . . . loss causation was properly alleged based on just the explosion.” (citing
In re Massey, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 626)).
94. Rapp, supra note 2, at 437.
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Defendants [misled] the market about the safety at its mines and its
commitment to put production over safety. Therefore, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged particular facts supporting an
allegation that its losses were caused by Massey’s misleading and
false statements about the safety of its mines. 95

A report commissioned by former Governor Joe Manchin,
the McAteer Report, attributed the explosion to the ignition of a
pocket of methane gas, fueled by coal dust that had been allowed
to build up in the mine.96 The McAteer report found that the
ignition and subsequent explosion could have been avoided if the
company had complied with basic mine safety requirements.97
A brief review of the science governing the genesis and flame
acceleration of explosions from methane-air mixtures is
instructive. When the build-up of a flammable gas, such as
methane, reaches a certain concentration range, a fire or
explosion can be ignited by an ignition source, such as a spark
or flame.98 Mixtures of combustible fuels and air will burn only
if the fuel concentration lies within well-defined lower and upper
bounds, referred to as explosion limits.99 The minimum

95. In re Massey, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
96. J. DAVITT MCATEER ET AL., UPPER BIG BRANCH: THE APRIL 5, 2010,
EXPLOSION: A FAILURE OF BASIC COAL MINE SAFETY PRACTICES 67 (2011);
Sazal Kundu et al., A Review on Understanding Explosions from Methane-Air
Mixture, 40 J. LOSS PREVENTION PROCESS INDUS. 507, 509 (2016) (noting that
methane gas that becomes trapped in the coal matrix during the coal formation
process is released when the coal is mined. The released methane gas
accumulates in the mine and becomes a potential explosion hazard (citing
Pramod Thakur, Coal Seam Degasification, in HANDBOOK FOR METHANE
CONTROL IN MINING 77 (Fred Kissell ed., 2006)); Charles N. Stickeler, A Deadly
Way of Doing Business: A Case Study of Corporate Crime in the Coal Mining
Industry 7 (2012) (Master’s Thesis, University of South Florida) (on file with
Digital Commons, University of South Florida) (“[T]he footprint left behind in
the Upper Big Branch Mine tells . . . the story of an explosion that started with
the ignition of a small amount of methane gas which was then fueled by coal
dust that had been allowed to build up for miles throughout the mine.”).
97. MCATEER ET AL., supra note 96, at 76–84, 97–98; see also In re Massey,
883 F. Supp. 2d. at 626.
98. Kundu et al., supra note 96, at 509 (“[A] methane concentration of
~9.5% in air is the most explosive methane-air mixture. While any methane
concentration within the flammability range has the potential to explode in the
presence of an ignition source, a methane concentration of ~9.5% in air can
produce the most damaging explosion.”).
99. See F. Van den Schoor et al., Calculation of the Upper Explosion Limit
of Methane-Air and Propane-Air Mixtures at Elevated Pressures and
Temperatures, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON FIRE
AND EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS 227, 227–28 (2007) (discussing what explosion limits
are and how to calculate them).
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concentration of a particular fuel necessary to support its
combustion in air is defined as its Lower Explosive Limit
(LEL).100 The maximum concentration of a fuel that will burn in
air is defined as the Upper Explosive Limit (UEL).101 Below the
LEL the mixture is too lean to burn and above the UEL the
mixture is too rich to burn. The range between the LEL and UEL
is known as the explosive range for that particular fuel.102
Explosive limits vary with each combustible gas.103 The
explosive limits also vary with temperature and air pressure.104
For methane, the LEL is around five percent, and the UEL is
nearly sixteen percent for gas at twenty degrees Celsius and air
at atmospheric pressure.105 At higher temperatures, the UEL
value for methane increases, while the LEL decreases.106
Consider now the following hypothetical based on the facts
of Massey. Suppose as in Massey, false and misleading
statements and omissions by a company about the safety of its
mining operations inflated the price of its common stock. An
explosion of a combustible gas reveals the risks that the
company had fraudulently concealed. The company’s stock price
declines and investors who had bought the company’s stock at
an inflated price suffer losses.
Subsequent to the accident, scientists estimate the explosive
range of the gas based on the initial temperature of the gas and
ambient air pressure at the time of the explosion. The scientists
compare the concentration of the gas at the time of the explosion
to the range estimates and discover that the actual
concentration was more than twice the estimated UEL.
According to scientific state of the art prior to the accident, an
100. Kundu et al., supra note 96, at 508.
101. Id.
102. Id.; see also Lower and Upper Explosive Limits for Flammable Gases
and Vapors, WERNER SÖLKEN, https://www.wermac.org/safety/safety_what
_is_lel_and_uel.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2022) (“The minimum concentration
of a particular combustible gas or vapor necessary to support its combustion in
air is defined as the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) for that gas. Below this level,
the mixture is too ‘lean’ to burn. The maximum concentration of a gas or vapor
that will burn in air is defined as the Upper Explosive Limit (UEL). Above this
level, the mixture is too ‘rich’ to burn.”).
103. See Kundu et al., supra note 96; WERNER SÖLKEN, supra note 102.
104. Kundu et al., supra note 96, at 508.
105. Id. (“[T]he LEL of methane is 4.6 ± 0.3% . . . while the UEL of methane
is 15.8 ± 0.4% when methane is ignited in air at 20 ˚C and 100 kPa (relates to
ambient temperature and pressure).”).
106. Id. at 508–09.
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explosion could not occur under those conditions. At a
concentration in excess of twice the upper explosive limit, the
gas and air mixture would be considered too rich to burn. This
means that scientists could not, ex ante the accident, predict the
explosion that revealed the defendant’s fraud.
Investors in the company’s common stock who suffered
losses due to the fraud may file a claim under Rule 10b-5. To
prevail on their claim, the plaintiffs must plead and prove the
elements of a Rule 10b-5 action, including loss causation. The
analysis of loss causation as a proximate causal relation
presented in this Article has shown that there is no loss
causation, hence no 10b-5 liability, if scientists cannot ex ante
predict the disclosure event. Given the facts of the hypothetical,
the defendant may therefore escape liability.
The proximate cause issue in the Massey hypothetical is
analogous to that in Wagon Mound No. 1. In both cases the
defendant’s wrongdoing factually caused the plaintiff’s harm,
yet no proximate cause existed because the reasonable foresight
doctrine had been violated. In both cases the plaintiff’s harm was
triggered by a fiery ignition that scientists could not predict, and
in both cases the ignition was an essential element of the
systematic relationship between the defendant’s wrongdoing
and the plaintiff’s harm. In both cases, therefore, liability was
appropriately cut off under the reasonable foresight doctrine of
proximate causality.107
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article analyzes the loss causation element of Rule 10b5 as a proximate causal relation between an alleged violation of
Rule 10b-5 and a plaintiff’s economic loss. The analysis shows
that loss causation does not exist, and the defendant therefore
escapes liability, if scientists could not ex ante predict the
disclosure event that revealed the fraud and reset the inflated
market price. This conclusion holds even if the plaintiff had

107. The hypothetical also bears analogies to Doughty. In Doughty, the type
of harm (burning due to splashing) was foreseeable, yet the defendant escaped
liability, because scientists could not predict the mechanism by which it
occurred. Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co. (1964) 1 QB 518 (U.K.). In the
hypothetical, the type of harm (economic loss due to a corrective disclosure and
coincident price decline) was foreseeable, yet the defendant escaped liability,
because scientists could not predict the mechanism by which the corrective
disclosure occurred.
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satisfactorily pleaded and proven all other elements of a Rule
10b-5 action.
Events such as corporate disasters,108 regulatory action and
clinical trials in life sciences and pharmaceutical industries,109
medical events,110 and computer security breaches111 frequently
108. See, e.g., Bricklayers & Masons Local Union No. 5 Ohio Pension Fund
v. Transocean Ltd., 866 F. Supp. 2d 223, 245–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (plaintiffs
alleging that oil rig disaster resulting in stock price decline revealed company’s
inadequate maintenance and safety practices); Langevoort, supra note 3, at 967
(“Many securities fraud lawsuits follow corporate disasters of some sort or
another, claiming that known risks were concealed prior to the crisis.”).
109. See, e.g., In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 936 F. Supp. 2d 252, 266–68
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated in part, 819 F.3d 642 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing
reports of adverse clinical studies as corrective disclosures for purposes of loss
causation.); William O. Fisher, Key Disclosure Issues for Life Sciences
Companies: FDA Product Approval, Clinical Test Results, and Government
Inspections, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 116 (2002) (“What
biotechnology companies disclose—and decide against disclosing—about
[regulatory events and clinical testing matters] can influence the price of those
companies’ stocks. These disclosure decisions, therefore, can have important
securities law implications. Inaccurate statements—and, under some
circumstances, decisions to keep information about regulatory and testing
developments within the company rather than including it in a public
statement—may lead to private lawsuits, Securities and Exchange Commission
(‘SEC’) enforcement actions, and even criminal prosecutions.”); MICHAEL E.
CLARK, PHARMACEUTICAL AND MEDICAL DEVICE LAW REGULATION OF
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND MARKETING ch. 12.I. (2017) (“The life sciences
industry encounters heightened securities fraud liability for several reasons—
it is heavily regulated, highly profitable, and one in which a small fraction of
new products will ultimately get approved for sale and marketing.”).
110. See, e.g., In re Biogen Inc. Sec. Litig., 857 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2017)
(Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs alleged defendants had fraudulently failed to disclose
repercussions of patient death on company’s sales); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig.,
819 F.3d 642 (2d Cir. 2016); Fisher, supra note 109, at 136.
111. Securities fraud class actions have been filed following cyber-attacks.
See Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal
Securities Laws, Sgarlata v. Paypal Holdings, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 3d 846 (N.D.
Cal. 2019); Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the
Federal Securities Laws, In re Yahoo! Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK,
2018 WL 1062111 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2018); Class Action Complaint for Violation
of the Federal Securities Laws, Brock v. Equifax Inc., No. 1:17-cv-04510
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2017); Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint for
Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, In re Heartland Payment Sys. Sec.
Litig., No. 09-1043, 2009 WL 4798148 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2009), ECF No. 14;
Consolidated Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the
Federal Securities Laws, In re Qudian Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 17-cv-9741, 2019 WL
4735376 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019), ECF No. 134; see also Alert Memorandum,
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Cyber Breaches: Lessons Learned from
Shareholder Derivative and Securities Fraud Litigation (2018) (located at
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alert-memos-2018/cyber-breaches-
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trigger securities fraud lawsuits claiming concealment of known
risks in violation of a duty to disclose.112 The disclosure event
that reveals the risk in such a case may involve a novel scientific
principle or technology, such as an unpredictable drug
reaction113 or a novel computer security threat.114 The theory
developed in this Article may be relevant in such cases if a court
lessons-learned-from-shareholder-derivative-and-securities-fraud-litigationpdf.pdf) (“While the future of cybersecurity derivative and securities litigation
remains uncertain, there is reason to believe that the volume and success of
such suits may be on the rise. With respect to shareholder derivative lawsuits,
as cybersecurity issues become more ubiquitous, directors and officers will be
increasingly on notice of data breach risks, and plaintiffs will more easily be
able to argue that directors and officers should have been aware of the
company’s susceptibility to a cyberattack and should have taken efforts to
remedy the company’s vulnerabilities.”); Client Update, Davis Polk & Wardwell
LLP, Securities Fraud Class Action Suits Following Cyber Breaches: The
Trickle Before the Wave (Dec. 21, 2017) (located at https://www.davispolk.com
/insights/client-update/securities-fraud-class-action-suits-following-cyberbreaches-trickle-wave) (“Large-scale data breaches can give rise to a host of
legal problems for the breached entity, ranging from consumer class action
litigation to congressional inquiries and state attorneys general investigations.
Increasingly, issuers are also facing the specter of federal securities fraud
litigation.”).
112. See David F. Boyle, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1615
(1972); Langevoort, supra note 3, at 969 (“High-profile [corporate disaster]
events . . . nearly always produce high-stakes litigation.” (citing Hillary A. Sale
& Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class
Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 487 (2015))).
113. See, e.g., Michael J. Rieder, Mechanisms of Unpredictable Adverse Drug
Reactions, 11 DRUG SAFETY 196 (1994); Sandra R. Knowles et al., Idiosyncratic
Drug Reactions: The Reactive Metabolite Syndromes, 356 LANCET 1587, 1587
(2000) (“Adverse drug reactions can be classified into type A, or predictable,
reactions and type B, also known as unpredictable or idiosyncratic reactions.”);
George A. Mocsary, Statistically Insignificant Deaths: Disclosing Drug Harms
to Investors (and Patients) Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111,
122–23 (2013).
114. See, e.g., Meiring de Villiers, Enabling Technologies of Cyber Crime:
Why Lawyers Need to Understand It, 11 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 38–39
(2011) (“The rapid development of [computer] virus technology has introduced
an unpredictable element into the behavior of viruses. New virus creations often
have the explicit goal of making detection more difficult and expensive.
Innovations with this goal in mind include stealth, polymorphic, and
metamorphic viruses. Stealth viruses are designed to evade detection, and
polymorphic and metamorphic viruses are programmed to change their nature
and identity. Unpredictable aspects of virus technology may cause a negligence
action to fail on proximate cause grounds. In a particular virus incident, an ex
post obvious systematic relation may exist between a defendant’s wrongdoing
and the harm caused by a novel virus. If, however, computer scientists could
not ex ante predict this relation due to the novelty of the technology, the
plaintiff’s case may fail under the Reasonable Ignorance doctrine.”).
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accepted expert testimony that, due to the novelty of the science
and technology involved, scientists could not ex ante predict the
disclosure event.

***

